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The focus of this Essay is on the importance of apparent honesty to the
persuasive force of Supreme Court opinions.1 Several scholars and Justices of
+
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1. Apparent honesty is the idea that Justices must both be honest and appear honest. The
focus of this Article is distinct from judicial candor. Many scholars have addressed the topic of
judicial sincerity, judicial candor, and judicial fidelity to the law. See, e.g., Erin F.
Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 12–
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the United States Supreme Court have noted that the Court’s legitimacy is
uniquely tied to the persuasive force of its opinions.2 Alexander Hamilton
famously described the federal judiciary as possessing “neither force nor will
but merely judgement.”3 Hamilton employed this phrase to support his
argument that the judicial branch “will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution.”4 However, more than explaining the
infirmities of the federal judiciary as compared to the executive or legislative
branches, Hamilton captured something essential about the judiciary. The
Supreme Court’s judgments are both the exercise of the Court’s power and the
justification for that power. Thus, the opinions of its Justices must be persuasive.
The study of persuasion has long recognized three principle methods or modes
of convincing an audience of the correctness of a particular view.5 Those

16 (2016); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to Law: The Coxford Lecture, 24
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 305, 305 (2011); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1310–13, 1386–87 (1995) (analyzing the arguments for a pro-candor rule in
judicial-opinion writing and then asserting that the arguments in favor of the pro-candor default are
unpersuasive); Therese H. Maynard et al., Symposium Transcript, Panel Exchange the Fourth
Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture Central Bank: The Methodology, the Message, and the Future, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 73, 85 (1995); David L. Shapiro, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth
Anniversary of the Harvard Law Review: In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731,
731 (1987) [hereinafter Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor]; Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994) [hereinafter Shapiro, Judges as Liars]; see also
Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2010) (pointing out that the sincerity debate is more far reaching than
just judicial decision makers and discusses the role of sincerity in the explanations of all public
decision makers).
2. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The Court’s power lies…in
its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in people’s acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”); see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1207, 1254 (1984) (“The Court can establish
its legitimacy by writing persuasive opinions that justify its conclusions. Hence, as long as the
Court follows this socially accepted judicial role, it is likely to retain its legitimacy regardless of
the theory of judicial discretion that it employs.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99–101 (1959) (arguing that Supreme Court opinions can
undermine the Court’s legitimacy because they are often poorly written and have an insufficient
basis in law); Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing,
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 237 (2008) (“The judiciary’s power comes from its words alone—
judges command no army and control no purse. In a democracy, judges have legitimacy only when
their words deserve respect, and their words deserve respect only when those who utter them are
ethical.”). But see Marc O. DeGirolami, Congressional Threats of Removal Against Federal
Judges, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 111, 152 (2005).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4. Id.
5. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 38 (George A. Kennedy
trans., 2nd ed. 2007) (identifying three modes of persuasion: “the character [(ethos)] of the
speaker…disposing the listener in some way and…the speech [(logos)] itself, by showing or
seeming to show something”).

2020]

The Value of Apparent Honesty in Supreme Court Opinions

249

methods are appeals to logic,6 credibility,7 and emotion.8 All three methods of
persuasion, in proper balance, are necessary and appropriate tools of rhetoric,
but I assert that ethos/credibility is particularly important to a court, and, more
specifically, to the United States Supreme Court.
Philosophers have discussed the significance of ethos to persuasion for
thousands of years. As part of this discussion, ethos has been defined in a variety
of ways but generally centers on the idea of credibility.9 Plato suggested that
true rhetoric requires a speaker to understand the soul of his audience and then
to appeal to it.10 Aristotle asserted that appeals to ethos are “almost…the most
authoritative form of persuasion.”11 He went on to explain that ethos-based
appeals include convincing an audience that the speaker is: of good moral
character; has good will for/toward the audience; and has good sense.12 Modern
rhetoricians like Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca13 and Blitzer14 have continued to
6. See id. at 38–39 (“Persuasion occurs through the arguments [(logoi)] when we show the
truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”).
7. See id. at 38 (“[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in
such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence….”).
8. See id. at 39 (“[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion
[(pathos)] by the speech….”).
9. See James S. Baumlin & Craig A. Meyer, Positioning Ethos in/for the Twenty-First
Century: An Introduction to Histories of Ethos, 7 HUMANITIES 1, 4 (2018). Baumlin and Meyer
note:
Like many terms from Greek philosophy (logos, pistis, kairos, to give a few) ethos
remains untranslatable in any word-for-word correspondence. Numerous terms gesture
in its direction, though no one word or phrase captures its nuances in English. Character,
authority, charisma, credence, credibility, trust, trustworthiness, sincerity, “good sense,”
goodwill, expertise, reliability, authenticity, subjectivity, “the subject,” self, selfhood,
self-identity, image, reputation, cultural identity, habit, habitus, habituation, person,
persona, impersonation, performance, self-fashioning, voice, personal style: these make
for a sampling of stand-in terms.
Id.
10. JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN INTRODUCTION (4th
ed. 2009) (quoting PLATO, PHAEDRUS 70) (noting that rhetoric was the “art of influencing the
soul…through words” and to effectively influence an individual the speaker “must discover the
kind of speech that matches each type of nature”); see also ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL
AND CRITICAL THEORY xv–xvi (James S. Baumlin & Tita French Baumlin eds., 1994) (noting that
Aristotle’s discussion of ethos is in response to “Plato’s call for an ethical rhetoric, a rhetoric
addressed to the soul of the individual”).
11. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 39.
12. James L. Kinneavy & Susan C. Warshauer, From Aristotle to Madison Avenue: Ethos and
Ethics of Argument, in ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note
10, at 171, 174–80.
13. See CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON
ARGUMENTATION 22 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969) (1958) (“A great orator is
one who possesses the art of taking into consideration, in his argument, the composite nature of his
audience.”).
14. See Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 7–9 (1968).
Bitzer’s influential work identified three constituent parts of any given rhetorical situation. One of
those parts is the audience. According to Bitzer, “Since rhetorical discourse produces change by
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assert that advocates must craft their rhetoric with the composition of their
audience in mind. Thus, when making an ethos-based appeal the speaker should
adjust his/her appeal to the character-based expectations of a particular audience.
We can call this “role-based credibility.” I assert that this “role-based
credibility” is particularly important in the context of Supreme Court opinions—
perhaps even the most important component to a Justice’s opinion. I further
assert that of the various factors that affect the credibility of a Justice’s opinion,
apparent honesty is the most important.
This Essay draws a distinction between apparent and actual honesty that
should be explained. Judicial honesty or judicial candor is the subject of
significant scholarly attention, but it is not the focus of this Essay. Rather, my
focus is on the importance that appearing honest has on the persuasive force of
an opinion and the dangers associated with failing to achieve that goal. This
distinction is not intended to suggest Justices should seek apparent honesty while
not being actually honest. Rather, this Essay emphasizes that actually honest
opinions must also be apparently honest. Thus, judicial candor is necessary to
apparent honesty, but it is not always sufficient on its own.
To support my assertions, this Essay is divided into three Sections. Section I
briefly discusses the elements of an Aristotelian ethos-based appeal and how
such appeals are generally derived. Section II applies this approach to Supreme
Court opinions and attempts to defend my formulation of apparent honesty.
Finally, I identify friction points in Supreme Court decisions where there is a
heightened danger of appearing less than fully honest. Given the harm failing
to appear honest can have on the Court’s credibility, avoiding such an
appearance is critical. I assert that there are at least three circumstances where
the danger of appearing less than fully honest is increased. These three
credibility “choke points” involve stare decisis, high-profile politically
contentious cases, and changes in a Justice’s position.
I. ETHOS: “THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE FORM OF PERSUASION”15
As mentioned above, Aristotle claimed appeals to character are “almost…the
most authoritative form of persuasion.”16 This quote is particularly relevant to
opinions issued by Supreme Court Justices because, as Aristotle observed,
appeals to ethos are especially powerful “in cases where there is not exact
knowledge but room for doubt.”17 In most, if not all, cases heard by the Supreme
Court there is room for doubt, otherwise the Court would not have granted
certiorari.

influencing the decision and action of persons who function as mediators of change, it follows that
rhetoric always requires an audience….” Id. at 7.
15. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 39.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 38.
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The Greek word ethos is frequently translated in English to mean character
and is similar to the word ethics.18 Both ethics and character suggest a fixed
pattern or habit of behavior. However, in the context of Aristotelian rhetoric,
ethos has a more fluid definition.19 Further, what I speak of in this Essay is not
ethical opinion writing. Rather, I speak of ethos in Supreme Court opinions as
Aristotle described its use in On Rhetoric,20 as a practical tool of persuasion and
how apparent honesty is a necessary part of that tool.
According to Aristotle, ethos as a tool of persuasion, includes three
component parts: “[t]hese are practical wisdom [phronēsis] and virtue [aretē]
and good will [eunoia].”21 Each component is explained in some detail either
explicitly or implicitly in On Rhetoric,22 but these terms can perhaps be better
understood in the following way: we trust advocates if we believe they have
good judgment, are good people, and wish good things for us—the audience.
It is important, however, to note that Aristotle is not speaking of ethical
persuasion, but rather the use of appeals to the character of the speaker to
persuade.23 This distinction is worth some explanation. Ethical persuasion,
which is a subject of significant importance in the law, focuses on the fair use of
argument.24 It is well understood that appeals to an audience’s bias or prejudice
can have an inordinate impact on the outcome of a dispute. Thus, arguments
which play on these flaws in human decision making can be described as
unethical, as the argument is designed to cloud a decision with what should be

18. See id.
19. There are a number of distinct views of the role of ethos among classical rhetoricians. Of
particular note is the distinction between Aristotle’s approach and Cicero and Quintilian’s.
Aristotle discusses ethos as a manner of persuasion, while Cicero and Quintilian assert that people
of good moral character make the best advocates. See Tita French Baumlin, “A good (wo)man
skilled in speaking”: Ethos, Self-Fashioning, and Gender in Renaissance England, in ETHOS: NEW
ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 10, at 229, 232 (noting how Cicero
and Quintilian focused on ethos as a speaker’s characteristic rather than as a principle method of
persuasion). It is noteworthy that some scholars have asserted that Cicero and Quintilian do address
ethos, but they discuss it as it manifests in the speaker’s manner. According to Cicero, the
obligations of the speaker include charming the audience through manners “or uncorruptibility of
the speaker as of affability or manners.” GEORGE KENNEDY, QUINTILLIAN 75 (1969). Others
assert that “the orator cannot be perfect unless he is a good man.” Baumlin, supra, at 232 (internal
citation omitted).
20. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 39.
21. Id. at 112.
22. The title of Aristotle’s work has been translated in several different ways. Some authors
have referred to Aristotle’s work as Rhetoric (C.D.C. Reeve trans.), The Art of Rhetoric (John
Henry Freese trans.), or Treatise on Rhetoric (Theodore Buckley trans). In this Article, I rely on
George Kennedy’s translation, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. See ARISTOTLE, supra
note 5.
23. See id. at 38.
24. See RICHARD L. JOHANNESEN, PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICS IN PERSUASION 28-29 (1995).
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irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute.25 Ethos in argumentation is the
process of convincing an audience that you possess the qualities of practical
wisdom, virtue (which will be described below), and good will toward the
audience.26 A reader might ask, is being ethical not the same as appearing
ethical? Or said another way, do not those who act ethically also appear ethical?
My response would be not always. It is easy to envision a circumstance where
an ethical individual may make an argument that appears to lack credibility. A
famous example can be drawn from the 1988 United States presidential race.
In the 1988 presidential race, then Vice President George H. Bush was running
against Governor Michael Dukakis. During a debate between the candidates,
Governor Dukakis was asked, “Governor, if Kitty Dukakis [(Governor
Dukakis’s wife)] were raped and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable
death penalty for the killer?”27 The Governor had a long and well established
record of opposing the death penalty.28 Governor Dukakis’ response was, “No,
I don’t…I think you know that I’ve opposed the death penalty during all of my
life.”29 After Governor Dukakis gave his answer, observers in the press room
said, “He’s through.”30 Governor Dukakis lost the election, and although his
defeat cannot be blamed entirely on this response, it is widely believed to have
contributed to the loss.31
Given Governor Dukakis’ life-long, steadfast opposition to the death penalty,
it is likely that his answer was honest, but it did not appear credible. Some have
pointed out that the Governor’s response was without emotion, and so it could
be framed as a failure in pathos (appealing to emotion),32 but I believe the failure
was also ethos based.33 In addition to appearing cold, the Governor’s answer
25. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 31–32 (stating that it is wrong to guide a jury towards
emotions like “anger or envy or pity” and comparing such an appeal to these emotions with making
a “straight-edge ruler crooked before using it”).
26. See id. at 112.
27. Roger Simon, Questions that Killed Candidates’ Careers, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2007 6:09
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2007/04/questions-that-kill-candidates-careers-003617.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. It is at least worth noting that even years later Governor Dukakis did not believe the
answer was that bad. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Armed Standoff: The Impasse in Gun
Legislation and Litigation: Article: Sound-bite Gun Fights: Three Decades of Presidential
Debating About Firearms, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1015, 1022–23 (2005); M.J. Stephey, Top Ten
Memorable
Debate
Moments:
Dukakis’
Deadly
Response,
TIME
(2019),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1844704_1844706_1844712,00.ht
ml (last visited Sep. 10, 2020).
32. See ROBERT N. SAYLER &MOLLY BISHOP SHADEL, TONGUE-TIED AMERICA: REVIVING
THE ART OF VERBAL PERSUASION 182–83 (2nd ed. 2014).
33. Professor Sayler has discussed the example of Governor Dukakis’ answer to the question
regarding his wife in lectures as part of the class he co-teaches with Professor Shadel. During these
lectures Professor Sayler discusses Governor Dukakis’ answer as a failure of pathos, ethos, and
logos. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 27.
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simply did not appear believable. Perhaps the Governor could have said
something like, “If someone raped and murdered Kitty I would want to kill that
person myself, but what if I was wrong? What if the person I believed committed
these horrible crimes did not? The horror of the crimes you describe would be
redoubled by the state sanctioned murder of an innocent citizen.” It is easy to
arm-chair quarterback such events, but the point is, being a person of character
and using appeals to character in argument are distinct.
A. Virtue
Aristotle discusses the nature of virtue in both On Rhetoric and The
Nicomachean Ethics.34 In On Rhetoric, Aristotle states, “[V]irtue…is an
ability…that is productive and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing
good in many and great ways, actually in all ways in all things.”35 He goes on
to describe some of the subparts of virtue as, “justice, manly courage,
self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and
wisdom.”36
Although honesty or truthfulness is not explicitly mentioned in this
description, it is described as a virtue in The Nicomachean Ethics37 and is clearly
at the heart of Aristotle’s consideration of virtue with regard to persuasion. As
described in On Rhetoric, Aristotle also states that the adverse outcome of a lack
of virtue is where an advocate “do[es] not say what [he] think[s] because of a
bad character.”38 Thus, we trust good people, at least in part, because good
people do not lie.
B. Practical Wisdom
Aristotle described practical wisdom or prudence as the characteristic of being
able to “deliberate well.”39 This sort of statement has led some to describe
Aristotle’s definition of practical wisdom as “notoriously cryptic.”40 However,
it seems understandable that defining practical wisdom would, by necessity,
have to be general, just as explaining or defining common sense. In an apparent
nod to the importance of practical wisdom, Aristotle wrote, “Prudence as well

34. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 61–65, 75–83; see generally ARISTOTLE, THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (H. Rackham trans., 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (discussing the concept of moral
virtue and how man can acquire it).
35. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 76.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 241. Much of Aristotle’s Book IV is devoted to discussing prudence/practical
wisdom, however much of that discussion appears to be categorical: explaining how prudence is
different from scientific knowledge, or wisdom, or explaining how the various intellectual virtues
differ from the moral virtues. Id.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Id. at 345.
40. Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 127, 135–36 (1998).
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as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man’s proper function:
Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness
of the means we adopt to gain that end.”41 This, and other passages have caused
some to refer to practical wisdom as the master virtue.42 This discussion is
consistent with Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue as a practical philosophy where
theory must be put into action.43
C. Good Will or Well Disposed Toward the Audience44
George Kennedy, a noted classical scholar, has observed that Aristotle’s
discussion of displaying good will toward an audience describes a more
pragmatic approach to connecting with an audience than other classical
philosophers, but is also more “open to possible abuse.”45 This seems quite
accurate. Aristotle suggests that speakers adjust their rhetorical appeals to the
psychological make-up of the audience.46 For example, Aristotle asserts that the
character of the young includes that, “they are impulsive and quick-tempered
and inclined to follow up their anger.”47 Thus, a speaker should be aware of
such qualities in the process of persuasion.
At first, this aspect of ethos-based persuasion would seem least concerned
with honesty or truth. If viewed in isolation, Aristotle seems to infer that a
speaker should manipulate his audience based on the presumed biases or
prejudices of that group.48 However, in the broader context of On Rhetoric, that
does not seem accurate. First, Aristotle identifies the value and purpose of
rhetoric, stating, “[R]hetoric is useful…because the true and the just are by
nature stronger than their opposites.”49 Further, Aristotle rejects the authors who
seek to manipulate the emotions of the audiences to achieve a victory.50 He
specifically explains:
[O]ne should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a
question…not that we may actually do both (for one should not
persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice

41. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 367.
42. See Mark L. Jones, Developing Virtue and Practical Wisdom in the Legal Profession and
Beyond, 68 MERCER L. REV. 833, 843 (2017).
43. See Marcel Becker, Aristotelian Ethics and Aristotelian Rhetoric, in ARISTOTLE AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND JUSTICE 114 (Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer &
Nuno M.M.S. Coelho eds., 2013).
44. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 74.
45. Id. at 148.
46. See id. at 149.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 148.
49. Id. at 35.
50. See id. at 31. Aristotle writes, “[I]t is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger
or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straight-edge ruler crooked before using it.”
Id. at 31–32.
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what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to
refute if another person uses speech unjustly.51
It seems more likely that Aristotle’s reference to being well disposed to an
audience is advice to ensure speakers do not alienate an audience. As I will
discuss below, I assert that apparent honesty in the context of Justices on the
Supreme Court is a necessary component of being “well disposed to” the
Supreme Court’s audience.
D. Audience Expectation
Since the Peloponnesian War, rhetoricians have understood the importance of
meeting the needs and expectations of an audience.52 Adjusting the method of
persuasion to an audience has been discussed at length by classical rhetorical
philosophers like Aristotle and Cicero,53 and modern rhetoricians like Kenneth
Burk, Chaim Perelman, and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca.54
An early example of this dynamic is illustrated by Thucydides in The History
of the Peloponnesian War.55 Thucydides describes the process by which the
Spartans deliberated on whether to go to war with Athens and its allies.56 The
decision was made by the Spartan assembly.57 The Spartan King, Archidamus,
urged a calm reflective decision making process,58 while the Spartan ephor,59
Sthenelaidas, urged immediate violent action.60 Although the Spartan King
offered several valid, logical reasons to approach the decision to go to war
cautiously, the less reasoned, more passionate speech carried the day.61 One
scholar has asserted that despite Archidamus’ speech being more logical, he
failed to account for his audience.62 The Spartan assembly was suspicious of
long speeches, and was comprised of many soldiers who were in an angry frame

51. Id. at 35.
52. See David Cohen, The Politics of Deliberation: Oratory and Democracy in Classical
Athens, in A COMPANION TO RHETORIC AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM 22, 25–26 (Walter Jost &
Wendy Olmsted eds., 2004) (describing the deliberative process among the Spartans prior to the
vote on whether to go to war with Athens and pointing out that the most persuasive speech will
often be the one most tailored to the audience).
53. See HERRICK, supra note 10, at 8–9, 108.
54. See id. at 10.
55. See THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 33-43 (Richard Crawley
trans., 2017) (1874).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Ephor, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997) (defining
an ephor as “one of five ancient Spartan magistrates having power over the king” in ancient
Greece).
60. See THUCYDIDES, supra note 55, at 43.
61. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 26–27.
62. See id.
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of mind.63 Sthenelaidas presented a shorter, impassioned speech that played on
the Spartan’s fear of Athens growing even more powerful.64
II. ETHOS, HONESTY, AND THE SUPREME COURT
As discussed above, there is already a strong connection between the
sub-elements of ethos-based appeals and honesty. Below, I will argue that this
connection is even stronger when viewed in the context of the opinion of a
Supreme Court Justice. The Supreme Court’s audience is as diverse as any.
Justices seek to persuade the parties to the action, the public, lawyers, judges,
law enforcement, politicians, one another, and future audiences—particularly
future Justices of the Supreme Court. Nearly all the constituent parts of the
Supreme Court’s audience expect truthfulness. This expectation is manifest in
the idealized symbols of the Court, the structure of our government, and
empirically supported by the scholarship of social psychologists and law
professors researching procedural justice.65 I will discuss one possible exception
to this broad expectation of truth. This exception would apply in the
circumstance where what is legally correct is morally wrong. We can call this
the moral lie doctrine. The moral lie doctrine is arguably a sub-category of the
more commonly known idea of a noble lie.66 Several legal scholars have
suggested that in exceedingly rare circumstances a judge’s duty to the truth may

63. See id.
64. See THUCYDIDES, supra note 55, at 43 (“Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the
honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our
allies….”).
65. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 7 (2002) (explaining that people’s perception of
procedural justice is influenced by the degree to which they find the actors are honest and unbiased);
Symbols of Law Information Sheet, OFF. OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/SymbolsofLawInfoSheet%209-28-2015_Final.pdf
(last updated Sep. 28, 2015) (describing the scales of justice adorning the Supreme Court
building).
66. Numerous law review articles discuss the concept of noble lies in the context of judicial
decision making. The term noble lie is often traced back to Plato’s Republic, where he discusses
creating an ideal society. According to Plato, as part of the ideal society there should be one or two
founding noble lies. These lies, like all the citizens are of a single heritage or that the hierarchy of
society was divinely ordained, serve to bind and improve society. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1773 (2013) (“The noble lie
requires that the true justification for a practice remain concealed from the population subject to a
beneficial illusion, which means that judges cannot publicly offer that justification within the
system.”). I distinguish a noble lie from a moral lie in this paper and assert a moral lie is a
subcategory of a noble lie. Thus, all moral lies are noble lies but not all noble lies are moral lies.
Justices may commit a noble lie simply because they feel their proposed solution is the best for all
concerned to resolve a problem but do not feel the current legal framework would support their
conclusion. I make this distinction primarily because most of the scholars who discuss the
permissibility of a judicial lie do so when it is the morally right thing to do, not just the better
outcome. See id. at 1785.
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be trumped by a moral duty.67 I will suggest, at least in the circumstance of a
Supreme Court Justice, the moral lie doctrine should not apply.
A. Images of Justice
One of the most dominant images associated with the United States Supreme
Court are the scales of justice. The scales appear both inside the Court and
outside.68 In the circular published by the Court, the scales of justice are
described as “[s]ymbolizing the impartial deliberation, or ‘weighing,’ of two
sides in a legal dispute….”69 In several of these images the scales are held by a
blindfolded individual, further indicating the impartiality of the Court and, more
broadly, justice.70 I would also assert that blindfolded justice goes beyond mere
impartiality. Blindfolding the individual holding the scales removes even the
possibility of dishonesty.
The Supreme Court is, in theory, our nation’s most sophisticated scale of
justice.71 However, this assumes that the Justices of the Court are not placing a
metaphoric finger on one side of the balance. A Justice’s opinion is, in effect,
that individual’s account of the weighing. But to lie in an opinion is to give a
false weight, and it can be reasonably argued that a scale that does not measure
accurately is a scale not worth having.
Of course, it could also be argued that the Supreme Court is nothing like a
scale, and the scales on the Court are merely adornment. Usually, a scale
67. See Scott C. Idleman, supra note 1, at 1381 (analyzing the arguments for a pro-candor
rule in judicial opinion writing and then asserting that there are occasions where this pro-candor
default is inappropriate); see also Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, supra note 1, at 747;
Goldsworthy, supra note 1, at 305; Richard H. Fallon Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 2265, 2311, 2315 (2017) [hereinafter Fallon, A Theory of Judicial Candor]; Richard H.
Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1834–37 (2005) [hereinafter
Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution].
68. See Symbols of Law Information Sheet, supra note 65. There the scales are described as:
The Scales of Justice: Perhaps the most ancient symbol associated with the law is also
one of the most familiar, the Scales of Justice. Symbolizing the impartial deliberation,
or “weighing,” of two sides in a legal dispute, the scales are found throughout the
building.
Locations: In the Courtroom Frieze, scales are held by Equity in the north panel, Divine
Inspiration in the west panel, and are on the shield held by Youth in the east panel. The
West Pediment includes a figure of Liberty with the scales in her lap. On the front plaza,
the small blindfolded statue within Contemplation of Justice clutches them to her body,
the figure of Justice on the two lampposts hold them, and a small figure on the flagpole
base has them, too. The scales are also incorporated in the design of the bronze elevator
doorframes . . . , as a part of a repeating relief on the building’s exterior, as one of the
metopes in the Great Hall, and as a decorative motif on the ceiling of the Special
Library[.]
Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See
Introduction
to
the Federal
Court
System, OFFS. U.S. ATT’,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts (last visited Sep. 10, 2020).
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measures two objects in relation to one another based on the single quality of
measure. In many cases, the Supreme Court is called upon to balance the diverse
needs of a nation: individual rights against the public good; policy needs against
litigant needs; responsible adaptations to new realities against stare decisis; and
the Court’s power against the other branches of government. Take, for example,
the case of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.72 The
Court had to navigate questions of legislative and state authority, individual
rights, and judicial interpretation of statutory language, while the nation watched
and waited for its decision.73 Thus, the scale metaphor fails to capture the full
range of competing interests at stake in some cases.
To this argument, it can be countered that because of the complexity of the
matters that are considered by the Court, the opinions of its Justices must remain
at their essence simple. In the end, every decision the Court makes balances
evidence, arguments, and policies in a context where one side will win, and one
side will lose. Some Justices on the Supreme Court have likened being a judge
to being an umpire in baseball.74 An umpire is called upon to do more than just
ensure the rules of baseball are followed.75 Umpires encourage sportsman like
conduct, look out for the safety of players, and ensure the game moves along in
a timely manner, but none of that matters if they do not call balls and strikes
honestly.76
B. The Baggage of Life Tenure
Audience expectation of truthfulness can also be inferred by the unique place
the Supreme Court occupies in our republic. The Court is distinctly
undemocratic. Unelected and serving for life, Justices are not subject to the will
of the people in the traditional sense.77 If the people of the United States are
72. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
73. See id. at 562–65.
74. See, e.g., Scott Shane, In Capital and at the Court, Baseball Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/05/politics/politicsspecial1/in-capital-and-at-the-courtbaseball-rules.html?_r=0 (noting that “John G. Roberts Jr., talk[ed] his way to confirmation as
Chief Justice of the United States with the insight that ‘judges are like umpires’”) (emphasis added);
see also Thomas Jipping, Is a Judge a Player or an Umpire?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/judge-player-or-umpire (“Judge Brett Kavanaugh
has embraced the parallel between a judge and an umpire. In [a] March 2015 speech at Catholic
University School of Law, for example, he outlined ten principles by which a ‘good judge’ is like
an umpire. ‘To be an umpire as a judge,’ he said, ‘means to follow the law and not to make or remake the law—and to be impartial in how we go about doing that.’”).
75. See Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911, 931–32
(2018); see also Roberts: ‘My Job is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat’, CNN (Sept.
12, 2005 4:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ (noting that
before becoming Chief Justice, John Roberts famously declared that as a judge his job was to call
the balls and strikes, not to pitch or bat).
76. See Iuliano, supra note 75, at 931–34.
77. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial
Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 38, 39 (2006).

2020]

The Value of Apparent Honesty in Supreme Court Opinions

259

unsatisfied with Congress or a President, they can do something about it.78
Citizens regularly vote politicians or political parties out of power when they are
dissatisfied—this is not possible with Supreme Court Justices.79 So long as a
Justice serves with good behavior—which is to say, is not impeached—they will
remain on the High Court.80 In the history of the Court, only one Justice has
ever faced impeachment, and that was in 1805.81
The need for life tenure is well-explained in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist
Paper No. 78.82 Hamilton asserts that in order for the judiciary to be independent
of pressure from the executive and legislative branches or the passions of the
majority in a given moment, its Justices must be life-tenured and removable only
if they fail to meet the good behavior standard.83 The judiciary’s independence
is a necessary provision to ensure that the will of the people, as expressed in the
Constitution, is fulfilled.84 However, the fact that the people, who are superior
to all branches of government,85 have the final word is critical to this
arrangement. With respect to Supreme Court Justices, that final word cannot be
exercised through the traditional method of voting.86 Rather, that final word
must be exercised by alteration of the Constitution.87
With regard to the Constitution, if the people are dissatisfied with a particular
interpretation by the Supreme Court, they can vote to amend the document.88
78. See House of Representatives, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/
reference_index_subjects/House_of_Representatives_vrd.htm (last visited Sep. 10, 2020)
(explaining that Representatives serve for two-year terms, after which they must seek re-election);
Senators, U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/
Senators_vrd.htm (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) (explaining that Senators serve for six-year terms,
after which they must seek re-election); Tom Murse, How Many Years a President Can Serve in
the White House, THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/why-presidents-only-serve-twoterms-3367979 (last updated Aug. 12, 2019) (explaining that Presidents serve for four-year terms,
and may only be elected twice).
79. See Post & Siegel, supra note 77, at 39.
80. See,
e.g.,
Samuel
Chase
Impeached,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/samuel-chase-impeached (last visited Sep. 10, 2020)
(explaining that Samuel Chase was the only Supreme Court Justice to be indicted but was acquitted
because the charges against him were political in nature).
81. See id.
82. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 463–65 (Alexander Hamilton).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 469–70.
85. See id. at 466–67.
86. Post & Siegel, supra note 77, at 39 (suggesting that the demands of democracy are
fulfilled through the Senate confirmation process).
87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 468–69 (Alexander Hamilton); see
also Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193,
197 (1952) (arguing that democratic principles are realized through the provisions for amending
the Constitution).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
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For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,89 the Court ruled that the Constitution
contains a right to privacy that is inferred based on the penumbras and
emanations of several amendments to the Constitution.90 In Roe v. Wade, the
Court further concluded the right of privacy includes a woman’s right to choose
whether to continue with a pregnancy or not.91 This interpretation has been met
with significant resistance.92 The people have the option to change the
Constitution to either extend protection to unborn children or to explicitly
recognize a right to privacy that does not include abortion.93 However, if the
Court does not provide a truthful basis upon which it has concluded a law is
contrary to the Constitution, the people may be prevented from having their final
say.
At least two arguments might be raised against the above assertion. First, the
Supreme Court’s audience does not really concern itself with the undemocratic
aspect of the Court.94 Second, amending the Constitution is such a rare event
and is so difficult to achieve, that it is not a valid option and thus serves as a
false reason to claim the Court’s audience expects honesty in a Justice’s
opinion.95
To the first argument, it could be claimed its major premise is flawed. The
undemocratic nature of the Court has been a significant concern to the public at
various times in American history.96 The Court’s uniquely unaccountable

of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Id.
89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. See id. at 484 (explaining that the guarantees protected by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments “create zones of privacy” implicitly protected by the Constitution).
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
92. See, e.g., Ashley Parker, 40 Years After Roe v. Wade, Thousands March to Oppose
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/us/politics/40-yearsafter-roe-v-wade-thousands-march-to-oppose-abortion.html.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
94. But see George Mace, The Antidemocratic Character of Judicial Review, 60 CAL. L.
REV. 1140, 1141 (1972) (noting the public sees a contradiction with the court’s unelected structure
and democracy).
95. See Constitutional
Amendment
Process, NAT’L
ARCHIVES
(Aug.
15,
2016), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution (last visited Sep. 10, 2020)
(explaining the lengthy, multi-step process to pass an amendment to the Constitution).
96. See, e.g., Mace, supra note 94, at 1141 (noting that many believe “judicial review is not
consistent with the spirit and form of democratic government”).
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position was a matter of debate in the Federalist and Anti-federalist Papers.97
Andrew Jackson was reelected in 1832, despite challenging the Supreme Court’s
supremacy in constitutional interpretation.98 He claimed that as the true
representative of the people, he had equal authority with the Supreme Court to
interpret the Constitution, and suggested he was not bound by the Court’s
interpretations.99 President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously considered altering
the composition of the Supreme Court because it failed to affirm components of
his New Deal platform.100 More recently, controversies involving public school
education and abortion have caused commentators to criticize the Court’s
undemocratic nature.101
As discussed above, Hamilton’s argument in favor of an independent judiciary
turns in part on the idea that the public has the least to fear from a Court that
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse.”102 However, being the
least dangerous branch does not mean the Court poses no danger. In order for
the people to counter the danger that the Court poses, the people must have, and
therefore expect, honest judicial opinions.
A second argument might assert that because there is practically no recourse
for the public to alter Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Constitution, the
reasons provided by the Court and its Justices are of little import. This argument
turns on the difficulty involved in amending the Constitution.103 Of course
difficult recourse is not the same as no recourse. In fact, several Constitutional
97. Brutus, Essay XV, in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES 304, 304–08 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (1788); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
supra note 3, at 469–70 (Alexander Hamilton); From Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, 25
March 1825, U. VA. PRESS, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEAprint-04-02-02-5077 (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) (explaining that the Supreme Court was “at first
considered…the most harmless and helpless of all [the government’s] organs” but has developed
to the point of “sapping and mining…the foundations of the [C]onstitution…”).
98. Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worchester v. Georgia
and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 549 (2002); John Yoo, Andrew Jackson and Presidential
Power, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 521, 550–51 (2008). In an address to Congress, President Jackson
stated: “The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of
Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority
of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive
when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their
reasoning may deserve.” Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139 (James D. Richardson, III ed., 2d ed.
1911).
99. Yoo, supra note 98, at 548–52.
100. William E. Leuchtenburg, When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme Court—
and Lost, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 2005), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/whenfranklin-roosevelt-clashed-with-the-supreme-court-and-lost-78497994/.
101. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1019, 1022 (1992).
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
103. Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending The Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (1998).
See Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra note 67, at 1807–08.
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amendments can be traced to a precipitating Supreme Court decision.104 For
example, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, was at least partially
a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Mitchell.105 Even more
recently, efforts have been made to amend the Constitution in response to
Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion rights and flag burning.106 Truthful
Supreme Court opinions are important for the public to determine if an
amendment to the Constitution is the appropriate course to follow.
C. Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Truthfulness
Legitimacy has always been a concern of the Supreme Court.107 This concern
has only deepened with time.108 Recent scholarship supports the intuitive
connection between the Court’s legitimacy and the public’s perception of the
honesty and character of the Court as reflected in its opinions.109
Beginning in the mid-1970s, scholars focusing on the intersection between the
law and psychology published the influential book Procedural Justice: A
Psychological Analysis.110 In Procedural Justice, Professors Thibaut and
104. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1230 n.155.
105. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134–35 (1970); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at
1230 n.155.
106. Lawrence K. Furbish, Constitutional Amendments to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions,
CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Sept. 25, 1996),
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dlps96/Rpt/htm/96-R-1042.htm. Since the Supreme Court decided Roe
v. Wade, there have been numerous efforts to amend the Constitution to authorize states or the
federal government to regulate abortions. Id. One proposal that would reverse Roe v. Wade, the
Hatch-Eagleton proposal, actually made it to a Senate vote. Steven V. Roberts, Full Senate Gets
Abortion Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1983, at A12. The Flag Desecration Amendments, which
have been voted on twice by Congress, once in 1995 and again in 2006, were in response to the
Supreme Court decisions Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990). See Marni Goldberg, Flag Desecration Amendment Fails, CHI. TRIB. (June 28,
2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-06-28/news/0606280130_1_american-flag-28thamendment-senate-on-tuesday-night; Robin Toner, Flag-Burning Amendment Fails in Senate, but
Margin Narrows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1.
107. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 22 (2010).
There, Justice Breyer states:
Although Marbury gave the Court the power to refuse to apply an act of Congress on the
ground that it violated the Constitution, the Court did not again exercise that power until
its decision in the Dred Scott case more than fifty years later. This hesitancy to find a
federal statute unconstitutional, like Marshall’s strategic view of Marbury, suggests a
Court deeply uncertain as to whether the president, the Congress, or the public itself
would accept the Court’s views about the Constitution.
Id.
108. Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court
Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 207 (2012). Farganis notes that the United States Supreme Court
mentioned concerns over institutional legitimacy only nine times before Brown v. Board of
Education and seventy-one times between 1954 and 2009. Id.
109. See id. at 213.
110. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975).

2020]

The Value of Apparent Honesty in Supreme Court Opinions

263

Walker examine how individuals and groups in the United States resolve
conflicts.111
Professor Tom Tyler, and others, have expanded Professors Thibaut and
Walker’s work by examining the impact of procedural justice on public
perceptions of institutional legitimacy.112 Professor Tyler has presented a body
of scholarly work that supports the conclusion that institutional legitimacy is
enhanced by perceptions of procedural justice.113 Honesty, or at least perceived
honesty, is one of the attributes recognized by Professor Tyler’s research as
leading citizens to see authority as fair.114 Thus, honesty is a component of
procedural justice, and procedural justice is important to institutional
legitimacy.115
Professors Tyler and Yuen Huo have also identified a related psychological
factor that impacts individual perceptions of institutional legitimacy called
motive-based trust.116 Motive-based trust relates to the public’s confidence in
the character of legal authority as inferred by “the actions” of that authority.117
Thus, the public’s perception that the actions of the Court reflect good character
also impacts the Court’s legitimacy. Consistent with Professors Tyler and Huo’s
work is the research of Professor Dion Farganis.118 Professor Farganis
investigated and found evidence that the manner in which the Justices write their
opinions impacts the public’s perception of the Court’s institutional
legitimacy.119
In addition to empirical research connecting the Court’s perceived legitimacy
to the apparent trustworthiness of its opinions, members of the Court have
recognized this connection.120 Justices on the Court have repeatedly commented
on the importance of the public’s perception of its legitimacy.121 One famous
example is included as part of the Court’s plurality opinion in Planned

111. Id. at 1.
112. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 65, at 7–18 (discussing the impact of procedural justice on
public perceptions of institutional legitimacy and arguing that people obey the law when they view
the enforcement agency and the promulgation process as legitimate).
113. See generally id.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 58.
117. Id. at 61–67.
118. Compare id. with Farganis, supra note 108, at 207–14.
119. Farganis, supra note 108, at 206. Professor Farganis concluded that “the message from
the results of this study is clear: reasons matter, but not as much as some might think. Therefore,
Justices who trim their rhetorical sails because they are concerned about public backlash may
sometimes do this unnecessarily. Loyalty to the Court, while not entirely static, runs deep. Why the
Justices seem to be unaware of this remains something of a mystery.” Id. at 214.
120. Id. at 208 (“Justice Samuel Alito opined during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing,
‘[T]he legitimacy of the Court would be undermined in any case if the Court made a decision based
on its perception of public opinion.’”) (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 207.
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Parenthood v. Casey.122 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (joined in part
by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) jointly wrote the opinion of the Court which
stated, “The Court’s power lies…in its legitimacy….”123
Social psychology has found empirical support for the intuitive statement that
judicial opinions demonstrating good character and honesty contribute to a
perception of legitimacy.124 Further, the Court’s perceived legitimacy is,
according to members of the Court, the primary source from which the Court
derives its power.125
It could be argued that trust and honesty are distinct concepts and one does
not necessarily require the other. Thus, the Court could retain its legitimacy so
long as it is trusted, even if it is understood that, from time to time, Justices will
bend the truth. Virtually no one lives by a rule of complete and total honesty
and yet each of us trusts others.126 Thus, we already trust people who we know
are not always honest. In fact, in some circumstances, we are likely to trust
individuals more for their well-intended dishonesty.127 Further, honesty, as a
stand-alone factor, is actually only a small part of procedural justice—a sub
factor of a sub factor. Honesty is also a small part of motive-based trust.128 It
could be argued that the real emphasis in motive-based trust, as it relates to the
Court, is on a belief that the Justices have a virtuous motive.
A possible counter to the above argument is that, even though honesty and
trust can be distinct factors, they nonetheless impact one another.129 Examples
where we might still trust an individual who has made a false statement usually
involve a person with whom we have a personal relationship.130 In that
circumstance trust is based on a confidence that the person has our best interest
at heart—thus a friend. In circumstances where a Justice of the Supreme Court
is explaining why a law is or is not Constitutional, trust is intimately linked to
honesty, as other foundations for that trust are limited.
Finally, it is easy to imagine circumstances where a person of character would
be untruthful. Imagine a friend who is the victim of domestic violence coming
to your home and asking for help. A few minutes after letting your friend into
your home their abuser shows up and asks where the victim is. There seems
little doubt that lying to the abuser would be both prudent and reflect good
character. However, the motive of a Justice for being untruthful is much more
122. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
123. Id.
124. TYLER & HUO, supra note 65, at 62–68.
125. Farganis, supra note 108, at 208.
126. THOMAS E. HILL JR., THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO KANT’S ETHICS 238 (2009). “Lying.
Some of Kant’s conclusions on the topic are infamously extreme” as Kant’s philosophy forbids all
lying. Id.
127. MARTIN JAY, THE VIRTUES OF MENDACITY: ON LYING IN POLITICS 31 (2010).
128. TYLER & HUO, supra note 65, at 62–64.
129. JAY, supra note 127, at 32.
130. Id. at 31.
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difficult to discern. Among the various reasons why a Justice might be
untruthful, there are just as many negative character-based reasons as positive
ones. Greed, arrogance, political gain—all could conceivably be motives. The
founders appear to have generally accepted the need for a separation of branches
as a means to prevent the consolidation of power and a downward slide to
tyranny.131 Is it not just as likely that the public would perceive dishonest
Justices as seeking to enhance the Court’s power, as opposed to a positive
character-based reason?
D. The Moral Lie
The final subcomponent of this Section regarding audience expectation and
the Supreme Court focuses on the rich debate surrounding judicial candor and
when, if ever, a Justice may lie. Several scholars have written on judicial candor
from a legal, ethical, moral, and practical perspective.132 As part of that
discussion, some have suggested that it may be permissible for a judge to be
untruthful.133 The most common position is that in exceedingly rare
circumstances, a judge may deviate from the standards of judicial candor when
morality demands an untruthful opinion.134 Although the focus of this Essay is
on the need for apparent honesty in Supreme Court opinions as a tool of
persuasion, I feel compelled to discuss the issue of moral lies because it clarifies
my theory of apparent honesty.
Several well-respected scholars have offered principled arguments in favor of
the moral lie exception. Professor Richard Fallon has written two articles that
touch on the subject.135 The first article discusses the various forms of
legitimacy that are related to the United States Supreme Court.136 The forms of
legitimacy Professor Fallon identifies are moral, legal, and sociological.137
Professor Fallon explains his belief that a Supreme Court decision can be
morally legitimate and legally illegitimate.138 Professor Fallon’s other article139
is a deep dive into the nuances of judicial candor—noting that judicial candor is
best understood as running along a spectrum with ideal candor at one end and

131. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 3, at 298 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of
all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.”); see also Charles Kesler, What Separation of Powers Means for Constitutional
Government, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/politicalprocess/report/what-separation-powers-means-constitutional-government.
132. See supra note 2.
133. Fallon, A Theory of Judicial Candor, supra note 67, at 2312.
134. Id. at 2310–11, 2315–17.
135. Id. at 2311; Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra note 67, 1834–37.
136. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra note 67, 1834–37.
137. Id. at 1790.
138. Id. at 1834, 1837.
139. Fallon, A Theory of Judicial Candor, supra note 67.
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minimally obligatory candor at the other.140 Professor Fallon presents a clear
and persuasive argument favoring judicial candor but allows for the possibility
of exceedingly rare circumstances where, on moral grounds, the obligation to
candor may yield.141 Professor David Shapiro, in his influential article, In
Defense of Judicial Candor, also accepted that there might be an obligation to
lie in the extremely rare circumstance where there is a “conflict between legal
and moral right.”142 Professor Idleman’s A Prudential Theory of Judicial
Candor discusses several reasons for deviating from the pro-candor rule,
including moral necessity.143 Other authors like Professor Ronald Dworkin have
written that when a conflict arises where doing what is legally correct is morally
wrong, a judge is permitted to lie.144
It is easy to see how the moral lie argument is appealing. Professor Fallon
describes the following:
Real examples may include criminal cases involving African
American defendants, some subject to the death penalty, that came to
the Supreme Court from what the Justices reasonably could have
supposed to be racially biased state courts during the Jim Crow era. In
a number of these cases, the state courts invoked state law grounds—
which, as a technical matter, would ordinarily lie beyond the capacity
of the Supreme Court to review—to refuse even to adjudicate the
claims of federal right that the defendants presented.145
When examining such cases like Brown v. Mississippi,146 where the
governmental injustice is appalling, the Court’s action is wholly correct.
Further, it is easy to imagine that if Justices of the Supreme Court had only done
what was morally right, decisions like Dred Scott,147 Plessy,148 and Korematsu149
would have never been written. What is more difficult to understand is why
Justices should cloak their moral decisions in a deceptive shroud of false
reasoning. If justice can be achieved by a lie, can it not also be achieved through
the truth?
It is possible that there is really no disagreement between my position and
authors describing a moral lie. The various authors discussing the exceptional

140. Id. at 2269.
141. Id. at 2311, 2317.
142. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, supra note 1, at 749; see also Idleman, supra note
1, at 1375–76.
143. Idleman, supra note 1, at 1381–87.
144. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, supra note 1, at 749. The example Professor
Dworkin provides is a law that punishes based on race alone with no legal basis to deny the law’s
application. Id.
145. Fallon, A Theory of Judicial Candor, supra note 67, at 2309.
146. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
147. Scott v. Stanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
148. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
149. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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circumstance of a moral lie may really only be describing the circumstance
where a judge or justice does not have a clearly established legal foundation to
support their exercise of power. Thus, if a Justice must exercise power where
they traditionally would not have power, the exercise of that power is a form of
a lie. I would not consider this to be a lie unless the justice or judge claimed a
power they did not believe existed.150 Thus, a Justice could explain that although
the Court traditionally would not have the power to resolve the issue at hand,
under the extraordinary circumstances of the particular case it does have the
power.
It could be argued that the moral lie justification is more appropriately applied
to judges rather than Justices.151 Obviously if a trial judge or intermediate
appellate judge encounters a situation where the legally correct action is at odds
with morality and the judge does the morally right thing and states it, that action
can be appealed.152 This problem is not present when the opinion is issued by a
Supreme Court Justice. No appellate body exists beyond the Supreme Court,
and absent a refusal on the part of the Executive or state governments to follow
the Court’s judgment, the decision would have the same effect whether the
rationale offered was honest or not. Thus, a Supreme Court Justice has even less
justification for a moral lie than a trial or intermediate judge.
Some have suggested that the moral lie is necessary to defend aspects of the
legitimacy of the Court while also vindicating the values at play in a particular
case.153 However, it could be argued that such an approach actually endangers
the Court’s legitimacy in situations where the public perceives that the Court
exceeded its authority, and lied about it. Moreover, difficult questions that exist
at the intersection between law and morality would seem to be exactly the sort
of occasion where honesty would be most critical. Although Justices on the
Supreme Court can rightly claim a unique and expert skill when addressing
questions of law, they have no greater entitlement to resolving questions of
morality than any other citizen. If the Justices of the Court were to encounter a
situation where morality and not the law were dictating the outcome of the case,
their obligation to sincere candor is heightened, not diminished.
150. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13 (1978)
(defining a lie as “any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.”).
151. See generally Shapiro, Judges as Liars, supra note 1; Idleman, supra note 1.
152. See The Editorial Board, Outrageous Sentences for Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/opinion/outrageous-sentences-formarijuana.html. In the area of mandatory sentencing, it is easy to imagine a situation where a
legally correct outcome is immoral. For example, in July of 2011 a seventy-five year-old man was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for growing personal use marijuana. Id. His
sentence was dictated by an Alabama mandatory sentencing law that required the sentence in cases
where the defendant had a prior conviction for certain violent crimes. Id. The defendant had a
two-decade old prior conviction for armed robbery. Id. It is relevant to this discussion that after
sentencing the defendant, the judge specifically stated that the sentence required by law was
unjust. Id.
153. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra note 67, at 1836.
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In recent years, two Supreme Court opinions have rejected the idea that the
Justices of the Court are permitted to impose their sense of morality through
their decisions.154 In Casey, the Court stated, “Some of us as individuals find
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot
control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code.”155 Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Lawrence
v. Texas addressing an anti-sodomy law cited to Casey and wrote, “The issue is
whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on
the whole society through operation of the criminal law.”156 These opinions
seem to foreclose the argument that a Justice should be permitted to lie on moral
grounds.
I agree there may be occasions where the demands of morality are in conflict
with the law and Justices on the Supreme Court feel compelled to act in
conformity with morality. I am not convinced that such actions will require
dishonesty.
III. Credibility Choke Points
Even when Justices strive to provide honest, practical, and competent
opinions they may face accusations that they have not been candid. Justice
Owen Roberts was reportedly deeply hurt by the rumor that he had switched his
vote in the 1937 case of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish157 for political rather than
judicial reasons.158 For decades since, it has been debated whether Roberts
switched his vote due to external political pressure or an internal jurisprudential
shift in his beliefs.159 I suggest part of this debate was exacerbated by the fact
that Justice Roberts failed to negotiate two of at least three common credibility
choke points.
Credibility choke points, as I call them, are points in judicial opinions,
particularly Supreme Court opinions, where there is a heightened danger of
appearing untruthful. These are opinions or passages in opinions, where the
danger of appearing dishonest is high, and so special care needs to be taken to
assure readers that the Justice is being candid and sincere. I suggest at least three
choke points: questions involving stare decisis, highly politicized cases, and
confronting changes in a Justice’s past opinions. Although I will be addressing
each of these choke points separately, it is not uncommon for a Justice to face
several choke points in a single opinion.

154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 849–50 (1992).
155. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
156. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
157. See generally West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
158. PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 39 (1982).
159. Id. at 39–40.
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A. Stare Decisis: What Does that Case Really Say?
One of the most common allegations directed against controversial opinions
is that the author has violated the doctrine of stare decisis.160 This allegation can
occur because critics believe the author of an opinion has refused to follow
precedent, has misread (purposely or not) the precedent, or has misapplied the
precedent.
Stare decisis is a short-hand method of capturing the idea contained in the
longer Latin phrase “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” which translates to
“stand by the decision and do not disturb what is settled.”161 The doctrine of
stare decisis is one of the theories of judicial interpretation upon which judges
across the jurisprudential spectrum can generally agree.162 Justices with as wide
and varied judicial philosophies as Justice Antonin Scalia163 and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg164 agree that stare decisis is an important doctrine, and it is
common for Justices to claim that stare decisis supports the outcome they
advocate.165 It is particularly interesting when both sides argue theirs is the
position that is true to the doctrine of stare decisis.166 Despite claims that stare
decisis supports an opinion, some of these arguments just do not appear fully
honest when subjected to close scrutiny. When these accounts fall apart, it often
leaves the appearance of a dishonest assessment of the prior case law. I have
chosen to address two majority opinions where the Justices’ approach to stare
decisis has been called into question. These cases are Dickerson v. United
States167 and Arizona v. Gant.168

1. Dickerson v. United States: Confronting the Miranda
Paradox169
Dickerson v. United States has the distinct air of a decision where, over time,
the Supreme Court backed itself into an untenable position that endangered the

160. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 411, 412–
14 (2010).
161. Edward D. Re, Stare Decisis and the Judicial Process, 22 THE CATH. LAW. 38, 38 (1976).
162. Kozel, supra note 160, at 412.
163. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS, 411–12 (2012).
164. Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of Process
and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 647, 657–60 (1998).
165. SCALIA & GARDNER, supra note 163, at 413–14.
166. An example of such a disagreement can be seen in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1609 (2015). There, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, and Justice Thomas, writing in
dissent, both cited Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) to support their resolution of the
case. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612, 1617.
167. See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
168. See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
169. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437–40. The Miranda Paradox resulted from the Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) decision and subsequent cases, which determined the requirements
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Miranda line of cases. As a result, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was the author
of two of the opinions that created the problem, ironically wrote the opinion that
saved the Miranda doctrine.
Dickerson v. United States brought to a head a clash between the Supreme
Court and Congress that had been brewing for over thirty years.170 Prior to
Dickerson, in 1966, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, where the
Court announced that police officers must advise suspects of certain rights when
being questioned in police dominated custodial settings.171 Miranda rights, as
they came to be called, are now well known by the public based, at least in part,
on depictions in popular television and movies. At the time of the decision,
many argued that the Court had overstepped and in an effort to legislatively
overturn Miranda, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), which states, “[A]
confession…shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”172
Despite Congress’s actions, it seemed that Miranda would go undisturbed, as
the decision itself was generally understood to conclude that the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution demanded Miranda warnings, thus placing the
matter beyond Congress’s control.173 Despite what seemed like a clear
constitutional rule, the Supreme Court in the 1970’s began chipping away at the
intellectual underpinnings of the Miranda case. In decisions like Michigan v.
Tucker,174 New York v. Quarles,175 and Oregon v. Elstad,176 a majority of the
Supreme Court referred to the requirement to give Miranda warnings as a
prophylactic rule.177 Thus, in each of these decisions, the Court found an officer
could violate the holding in Miranda by failing to give the prescribed warnings
before conducting a police-dominated custodial interrogation, without violating
the Fifth Amendment.178 These decisions set up the controversy in Dickerson:
if failing to give Miranda warnings did not violate the Fifth Amendment and
thus the Constitution, how was the Court able to apply the rule to the states and
ignore Congress’s action?179
established in Miranda were prophylactic yet not constitutional. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437–40.
Nonetheless, the majority found that Miranda still applied to the states. Id. at 438.
170. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435–44 (determining the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §
3501).
171. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2000).
173. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68.
174. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
175. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
176. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
177. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445–46.
178. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450. It is worth
noting that in Tucker the questioning of the suspect occurred before Miranda was decided.
However the discussion in Tucker laid the groundwork for later decisions where the failure to
provide Miranda warnings occurred after the Miranda decision.
179. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Miranda was a
constitutional decision and thus could not be overruled by act of Congress).
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Dickerson contained the right mix of facts and circumstances to bring the
various Miranda based decisions and 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) into clear conflict. In
Dickerson, after a bank robbery, an eye witness told the FBI the license number
of the getaway car.180 The car was registered to the defendant.181 The FBI asked
the defendant to come into a field office for an interview, which he did.182
During the interview, agents secured a search warrant and told Mr. Dickerson
they were about to search his apartment.183 Mr. Dickerson then made a statement
while in FBI custody without receiving Miranda warnings.184 After being
indicted, Mr. Dickerson’s lawyer sought to suppress the statement as being taken
in violation of the defendant’s Miranda rights.185 The trial court ruled that the
statement was inadmissible but the evidence that had been derived from the
unwarned statement was admissible because the statement was voluntarily
given.186 As a result of the trial court’s ruling, the Government took an
interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.187 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the factual findings of the lower court
but still reversed.188 The Fourth Circuit held that because Dickerson’s
confession was voluntary it was admissible according to 18 U.S.C. § 3501.189
The Circuit Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and not Miranda, “governe[d]
the admissibility of [all] confessions in federal court” (in-custody or not).190
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed, “This case…turns
on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely
exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of
congressional direction.”191 He went on to cite two primary arguments for why
Miranda was a constitutional decision. First, the only way that the Miranda
Court could apply its decision to the states would be if the decision was a
constitutional interpretation.192 Second, the Miranda Court clearly stated the
opinion was a constitutional decision.193 Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to
address some of the counter arguments to the majority’s opinion.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to several of the arguments
against the majority opinion, he failed actually to respond to the central question

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 674.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
Id.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 676.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
Id.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
Id.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 439–40.
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of the case. The Chief Justice claims that “[t]he Court of Appeals also relied on
the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule
in cases such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649…(1984), and Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222…(1971).”194 In response, the majority states, “These
decisions illustrate the principle—not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule—
but that no constitutional rule is immutable.”195 Next, the Chief Justice states,
“The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298…(1985), we stated that ‘[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule…serves the Fifth
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.’”196 In
response to this point, the majority explains that the Court’s refusal to extend the
Fourth Amendment fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda violations
does not establish that Miranda was not a constitutional rule.197 Finally, Chief
Justice Rehnquist frames Justice Scalia’s dissent as arguing “that it is judicial
overreaching for this Court to hold § 3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that
the Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that nothing
else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements.”198 In response to the
argument thus framed, the Chief Justice states, “[W]e need not go farther than
Miranda to decide this case.” 199
Chief Justice Rehnquist finishes the majority opinion by asserting that stare
decisis weighed heavily in favor of maintaining the Miranda warnings as they
had become part of police procedure throughout the country.200 There is some
irony in Justice Rehnquist’s appeal to stare decisis. Michigan v. Tucker,
authored by Justice Rehnquist, is the first case in which a majority of the
Supreme Court substantially relied on the assertion that Miranda warnings were
“prophylactic” to resolve the admissibility of a defendant’s statement.201 Thus,
it was Michigan v. Tucker that arguably violated the doctrine of stare decisis,
and then later opinions that perpetuated the break begun in Tucker. Justice
Douglas dissented in Tucker noting, “The Court is not free to prescribe preferred
modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis. We held the ‘requirement
of warnings and waiver of rights [to be] fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege,’…and without so holding we would have been powerless
to reverse Miranda’s conviction.”202 Thus, Justice Douglas asserted the majority
in Tucker failed to follow the doctrine established in Miranda (and thereby
violated stare decisis), and Justice Douglas pointed out the theoretical challenge
to the Miranda prophylactic rule that would ultimately lead to the Dickerson
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445–46 (1974).
Id. at 462–63 (citation omitted).
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opinion.
Despite the arguable logical impossibility of the Court’s
post-Tucker/Miranda jurisprudence, by the time the Court ultimately confronted
the issue, the Dickerson majority concluded that the Miranda decision was too
ingrained in American legal culture to be abandoned.203
It seems difficult to deny that Miranda warnings had become part of American
legal culture, but had the exceptions? Would it have not been more consistent
with stare decisis to recognize that the Miranda decision, as it was written before
Tucker, was deserving of greater precedential value? Instead, the Court arguably
maintained a paradoxical rule where there can be a violation of a constitutional
rule that does not violate the Constitution.
2. Arizona v. Gant: Preservation of Precedent in Name Only204
Arizona v. Gant dealt with the difficult question of how the search incident to
a lawful arrest doctrine should be applied to recent occupants of a vehicle. The
Court had been attempting to resolve this issue for over twenty years prior to the
Gant decision. First in New York v. Belton205 and then again in Thornton v.
United States,206 the Court issued opinions with a bright-line rule. The general
understanding of the Belton/Thornton rule was that officers were permitted, as
an incident to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle, to search the
passenger compartment of the vehicle.207
This rule did not require
individualized suspicion beyond the probable cause necessary for the arrest, and
it was justified by the need to ensure officer safety and to prevent the destruction
or concealment of evidence.208 The facts of the Belton and Thornton cases are
important to analyzing how the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens,
addresses stare decisis in Gant.
In Belton, an officer pulled a car over for speeding and discovered four men
inside.209 The officer observed that none of the men were on the registration of
the car, and there was the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the car.210 The
officer ordered the men out of the car and placed them under arrest.211 The men
were not handcuffed or placed in a police vehicle, but instead were required to

203. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
204. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
205. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
206. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
207. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (“[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile.”); see also Thornton, 451 U.S. at 622–23 (reinforcing
the core of the Belton holding and made it clear Belton applied even when the police effectuate an
arrest after a recent occupant of a vehicle has exited the vehicle and is under arrest at the time of
the search).
208. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622–23.
209. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
210. Id. at 455–56.
211. Id. at 456.
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sit in the median of the highway.212 The officer searched the passenger
compartment of the vehicle and discovered the defendant’s leather coat and
drugs in one of its pockets.213 The Supreme Court concluded that a bright and
clear rule was necessary.214 Thus, the Court ruled the search was permissible as
an incident to arrest. The majority went further and stated, “[W]e hold that when
a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile.”215 Although Justice Stevens concurred in the
Belton judgment, he wrote very little to explain his position.216
In Thornton, an officer’s suspicions were aroused when the defendant sought
to avoid driving his car near the officer.217 The officer ran the defendant’s
license plate and discovered the license plate did not match the defendant’s
vehicle.218 Next, the officer followed the defendant and observed him pull into
a parking lot and get out of his car.219 The officer drove up behind the
defendant’s car, got out of his vehicle, and accosted the defendant.220 The officer
asked the defendant if he could pat him down, and the defendant agreed.221
When the officer felt a bulge in the defendant’s clothing, the officer asked if the
defendant was carrying any illegal drugs on his person, and the defendant said
yes.222 The officer secured the drugs, arrested the defendant, placed him in the
back of the police car, and conducted a search of the defendant’s vehicle.223 The
search revealed a gun.224 Thornton was prosecuted for possession of narcotics
with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug
trafficking, and being a felon in possession of the firearm.225 The defendant
sought to suppress the gun, claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment.226
The trial court denied the motion, relying on Belton, and the Fourth Circuit
upheld the finding.227 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
Id. at 618.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 618–19.
Id.
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lower court’s holding.228 Justice Stevens dissented in Thornton, asserting that
the expansion of the Belton rule was unnecessary and unjustified.229
In Gant, police arrested the defendant for driving on a suspended license.230
After arresting him, police placed Mr. Gant in handcuffs and put him in the back
seat of a police car.231 Next, police conducted a search of the passenger
compartment of Mr. Gant’s car where they found cocaine and a gun.232 Mr. Gant
was charged with driving on a suspended license and possession of drug
paraphernalia and a narcotic drug for sale.233 Mr. Gant challenged the search on
Fourth Amendment grounds.234 The trial court denied Mr. Gant’s challenge but
the Arizona appellate court and Arizona Supreme Court disagreed.235 According
to the Arizona Supreme Court, the police violated Mr. Gant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.236 The court found that the search incident to arrest doctrine
did not apply in this instance because at the time of the search, Mr. Gant was no
longer able to access the passenger compartment and so it was no longer a search
incident to arrest.237
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-Justice majority, crafted a new approach to
searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle. Under this new
approach, an officer can search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
under two circumstances: (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search, or (2) if there is reason to
believe evidence of the crime of arrest can be found in the vehicle.238 Applying
this approach, the majority concluded that Mr. Gant was not within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment of the car at the time of the search
because he was handcuffed in the back of a locked police car. Nor was there
reason to believe evidence of the crime Gant was arrested for, driving on a
suspended license, would be found in the car.239
Although many believed Gant overruled Belton and Thornton, Justice Stevens
insisted that it did not.240 In his opinion, Justice Stevens asserts that the facts of

228. Id. at 619.
229. Id. at 633–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing to and referencing New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981)).
230. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 336 (2009).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 337.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 344–46.
238. Id. at 351.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 348–49 (citing to and referencing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)).
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Gant are clearly distinguishable from Belton or Thornton.241 Regarding Belton,
the defendants were arrested but not handcuffed or in a police vehicle, and there
was only one officer and four suspects.242 Justice Stevens distinguishes
Thornton by stating nothing more than “the petitioner [in Thornton] was arrested
for a drug offense.”243 He also wrote, “We have never relied on stare decisis to
justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice.”244
Five Justices on the Court disagreed with the majority regarding whether Gant
substantially overruled the Belton/Thornton rule.245 The conclusion that Gant
overruled the Belton/Thornton rule seems strong. First, the Belton/Thornton
rule, where an officer is always able to search the passenger compartment of the
vehicle of a recently arrested occupant, had been so widely accepted that it was
being taught at police academies.246 Also, numerous lower courts had
interpreted Belton and Thornton this way. Even the Arizona Supreme Court
stated, “We are aware that most other courts presented with similar factual
situations have found Belton and Thornton dispositive of the question whether a
search like the one at issue was incident to arrest.”247 Finally, the facts in the
Thornton case were strikingly similar to the Gant case, at least with regard to
when the search was conducted by the officers.
It is unclear from Justice Stevens’ opinion why he shied away from the
conclusion that Gant overruled Belton and Thornton.248 Given that Justice
Stevens dissented in Thornton and only concurred in Belton, he seems to have
disagreed with the Belton/Thornton approach from the beginning. Further, a
strong argument exists that Justice Stevens’ opinion is far more in line with the
Court’s broader doctrine dealing with searches incident to arrest. In fact, much
of the criticism of the Belton/Thornton cases asserted that the Court’s approach
had strayed from the doctrinal underpinnings of the search incident to an arrest
rule. Justice Scalia noted that such an approach imagines a “mythical arrestee
‘possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules.’”249
The confusion over why Justice Stevens insisted that Gant did not overrule
Belton and Thornton is deepened by his response to Justice Alito’s dissent.
Justice Stevens begins by stating that stare decisis is not a reason to continue to

241. Id. at 348 (citing to and referencing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)).
242. Id. at 348 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
243. Id. at 348–49 (referencing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)).
244. Id. at 348.
245. Id. at 351–54 (Scalia, J. concurring); id. at 354–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 349.
247. State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 645 (2007).
248. Colin Miller, Stranger than Dictum: Why Arizona v. Gant Compels the Conclusion that
Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests are Unconstitutional, 62 BAYLOR L. REV.
1, 38 (2010).
249. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626 (2004) (quoting United States v. Frick, 490
F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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permit a police practice that violates the Constitution.250 This argument only
makes sense if Belton and Thornton were unconstitutional and were now being
overruled. Next, Justice Stevens claims that overruling Belton and Thornton is
unnecessary because the two cases are easily distinguished from Gant.251
Although Belton does contain a number of important factual distinctions from
Gant, Thornton does not. In fact, Justice Stevens says nothing more to
distinguish Thornton from Gant than the defendant in Thornton was arrested for
a drug charge. This distinction is the weakest portion of Justice Stevens’
opinion.
Readers are left to wonder why Justice Stevens refused to just write that the
Court was overruling the Belton/Thornton rule. At least two authors have
accused the majority opinion of being “disingenuous[].”252 A number of
possibilities exist besides dishonesty. Perhaps Justice Stevens was concerned
about the second and third order effects such a wholesale action might have such
that the doctrine in Gant would inadvertently impact other aspects of the search
incident to arrest doctrine. Perhaps Justice Stevens was persuaded by the
Arizona Supreme Court’s argument that although the facts in the Thornton case
were similar to the Gant case, the legal question the Court resolved in Thornton
was not similar. The Arizona Supreme Court argued that the Thornton decision
only resolved whether the search incident to arrest doctrine dealing with
automobiles could be applied where the police encounter began after the suspect
exited the vehicle.253 Justice Stevens’ election to not explain more clearly why
the Gant decision was not overruling Belton or at least Thornton, raises
unnecessary questions about an opinion which appears to be a return to a more
sound approach.
B. Political Cases: The Kobayashi Maru254
When the Supreme Court confronts a highly politicized case, it can seem like
a no-win situation for the Justices. Recent decisions like Bush v. Gore and the
two decisions surrounding the Affordable Care Act seem to demonstrate this as
fact.255 Critical to the Court’s credibility is the perception that it is a neutral,

250. Gant, 556 U.S. at 348.
251. Id. at 348.
252. Andrew Fois & Lauren Simmons, Thomas Jefferson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s
Assault on the Belton Doctrine, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 4, 21 (2009).
253. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335–36.
254. Janet Stemwedel, The Philosophy of Star Trek: The Kobayashi Maru, No-Win Scenarios,
And
Ethical
Leadership,
FORBES
(August
23,
2015
10:15
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/23/the-philosophy-of-star-trek-thekobayashi-maru-no-win-scenarios-and-ethical-leadership/#30f032535f48
(explaining
that
Kobayashi Maru is a training exercise in the fictional Star Trek universe designed to test the
character of Starfleet Academy cadets in a no-win scenario).
255. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

278

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.2:1

non-political branch of government.256 It is clear that the Justices on the Court
believe the public’s perception of political neutrality is important.257 Nowhere
is that perception more challenged than when the Court must decide a highly
publicized political question. One recent example of such a case is Bush v.
Gore.258

1. Bush v. Gore: Deciding the Presidency
Never before had the United States Supreme Court effectively resolved a
presidential election.259 It is difficult to imagine a more politicized decision of
the Court. Making matters more challenging was the fact that the case involved
a nuanced interpretation of state voting statutes and detailed factual questions
like whether an indented ballot should count as a cast vote or if the voter must
actually perforate the ballot.260 Additionally, the Court and the state of Florida
were facing what seemed like an iron clad deadline.261 The country held its
breath and waited for an outcome—of course the decision is well known. The
Florida recount was stopped, and George W. Bush became President.262
Before the dust settled on the Supreme Court’s opinion, a new vote count
began, but this count only involved nine ballots. The most controversial part of
the Bush v. Gore decision was a 5–4 per curium opinion.263 The five Justices in
the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice O’Connor.264 All five members of the majority
who paved the way for the Republican nominee to become the President had
also been appointed by Republican presidents.265
Given the split of the Court and the highly political nature of the controversy,
special care was needed in explaining the majority opinion. Unfortunately,
many perceived the explanation as lacking.266 The per curium opinion
explained, “The recount process, in its features here described, is inconsistent
256. Carson Holloway, John Roberts: A Political Judge?, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 2, 2019),
https://www.heritage.org/node/14335069/print-display.
257. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111; Iuliano, supra note 75, at 917.
258. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111.
259. Peter M. Shane, Policy at the Intersection of Law and Politics: Panel One: When InterBranch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential
Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 536 (2003).
260. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103–06.
261. Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
262. Id. at 100–01, 110–11.
263. Id. at 100.
264. Id. at 99.
265. See Jess Bravin et al., Bush v. Gore Has Personal Angle for Some Supreme Court
Justices,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2000 12:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB976572470116168521.
266. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, A BADLY
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 9 (2002).
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with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each
voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single
state judicial officer.”267 Based on the above findings, the majority concluded
that the current procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.268 This conclusion was not overwhelmingly controversial. Seven
of the Justices on the Court believed the recount procedures were inconsistent
with Equal Protection.269
The most controversial aspect of the opinion was the decision to stop the
recount rather than remanding the case to the Florida State Supreme Court with
instructions to correct the procedures.270 The question of whether the state of
Florida could reorder its recount procedures in time to meet state and federal
statutory deadlines for certifying election results was in doubt.271 However, not
permitting Florida to try gave the per curium decision the air of corruption.272
Additionally, the majority opinion did little to refute the arguments presented
by the four dissenting Justices who each wrote opinions.273 The dissenting
Justices claimed that the majority failed to give the usual deference to the Florida
State Supreme Court in matters involving the interpretation of Florida law.274
Also, it was asserted that the majority should not have stopped earlier efforts to
conduct a recount, nor should it stop potential future efforts.275 Finally, the
majority was alleged to have abandoned its usual restraint, particularly in matters
involving political questions.276
In response to the dissenting opinions, the majority dedicated approximately
two paragraphs. The paragraphs stated:
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems
with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a
remedy. See post, at 134 (SOUTER, J., dissenting); post, at 145-146
(BREYER, J., dissenting). The only disagreement is as to the remedy.
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida
Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5,
JUSTICE BREYER’S proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida
Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest
until December 18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida
267. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109.
268. Id. at 103.
269. Id. at 111.
270. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore
from Its Hall Of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 175–77 (2001).
271. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109–10.
272. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000 174 (2001).
273. See generally Bush, 531 U.S. at 100–11, 123–58.
274. Id. at 123–24, 127–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 135–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Election Code, and hence could not be part of an “appropriate” order
authorized by Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than
are the members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of
the Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the President to the
people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When
contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it
becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and
constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.277
Despite lengthy dissenting opinions, the majority elected to offer little response
to the criticism.
Given the composition of the majority, the Justices must have anticipated the
reaction to their opinion.278 Although the majority explained the strongest part
of its argument clearly—how the current Florida recount rules violated Equal
Protection—it did little to explain why it did not give the state of Florida a
chance to try and correct the deficiency.279 Further, the majority offered little
response to the more elaborate arguments presented by the dissenting Justices,
thereby leaving the potential impression that the majority had no adequate reply.
The weakness in the majority opinion is made more apparent by the relative
strength of the three-Justice concurrence.280 The concurrence dedicates more
energy to responding to the dissents and is viewed by some as more
persuasive.281
Political cases demand a particular sensitivity by the Court to the public’s
concern regarding its status as a neutral non-political body.282 This need is all
the greater given the continuing politicization of the appointment process—
making the Justices on the Court appear more and more like political figures.
Given this backdrop, more explanation in a political case is preferred to less.
The public needs a thorough explanation of why the majority is correct, and clear
reasoning that provides some assurance that facts and law, rather than politics,
dictated the outcome. Further, a full confrontation of dissenting opinions is
necessary to dispel the potential appearance that the majority did not respond
because it could not.

277. Id. at 111.
278. Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore,
82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 616 (2002).
279. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
280. See id. at 111–22 (Rehnquist, J., with whom Scalia, J., and Thomas, J. join, concurring).
281. DWORKIN, supra note 266, at 16–17.
282. See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
153, 155 (2013).
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C. When Minds Change
The philosopher and author C.S. Lewis once explained that sometimes the
shortest path to a destination is backward.283 This seemingly counterintuitive
statement applies when a traveler discovers they have gone in the wrong
direction. So too with courts and judges. However, unlike a traveler who has to
very visibly and obviously change directions, judges and courts sometimes seem
to try and change direction without declaring the old path was wrong. Although
a written “about face” might not be as obvious as a traveler turning around and
walking back the way they came, it is sometimes nearly as obvious. However,
when Justices of the Supreme Court change jurisprudential directions or seek to
change the Court’s direction, particularly when it comes to positions they
themselves have taken in the past, an explanation is necessary if they are not to
appear dishonest. Below are two cases to illustrate this point. The first focuses
on what is likely the most well-known apparent “switch” in Supreme Court
history: Justice Owen Roberts’ decision to join the majority opinion in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,284 and a lesser known opinion from Justice Stevens
in Illinois v. Caballes.285 Both opinions demonstrate an apparent change in
position without an explanation.

1. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish: A Historic Switch
Dubbed “the switch in time that saved the nine,”286 West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish remains controversial today, more than eighty years after the decision
was published. Some claim Justice Roberts’ vote was merely the result of an
evolving view toward the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.287
Others assert Justice Roberts’ earlier votes were influenced by his own
aspirations to the Republican Party’s nomination to the presidency in 1936—
and after that possibility closed—his vote changed.288 Others still suggest that
factors outside the Court, including mounting public pressure, had an

283. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 22 (rev. ed. 1958).
[P]rogress means getting nearer to the place where you want to be, and if you have taken
a wrong turn, then to go forward does not get you any nearer. If you are on the wrong
road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; and in that
case the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive man.
Id.
284. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
285. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
286. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390 (17th ed.
1991) (stating “Some viewed Justice Roberts’s vote in West Coast Hotel as ‘the switch in time that
saved the Nine’ from the Court-packing plan…”).
287. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 45–46 (1998).
288. Brian T. Goldman, The Switch in Time that Saved Nine: A Study of Justice Owen
Roberts’s Vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, C. UNDERGRADUATE RES. ELEC. J. 1, 51–52,
80–94 (2012).
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influence.289 The fact that this debate continues demonstrates that there was a
need for an explanation.
The Parrish case came on the heels of a tumultuous period in the Court’s
history. Beginning in 1935 and continuing into 1936, the Court struck down
significant elements of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, prompting one
columnist to quip that the Court’s New Deal jurisprudence resembled the end of
a Shakespearian tragedy.290
One of the Justices who appeared to vote consistently (albeit not unerringly)
against the New Deal programs was Justice Owen Roberts.291 In 1936, the Court
decided the case of Morehead v. New York.292 In Morehead, the Court upheld a
lower court ruling that New York’s minimum wage law affecting women was
unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.293 Through Morehead, the Court upheld an earlier decision regarding
the constitutionality of minimum wage laws, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.294
Justice Roberts voted with the majority in Morehead, invalidating the minimum
wage law in New York.295 In 1937, the Court decided Parrish, which upheld a
minimum wage statute directed at women.296 Justice Roberts joined the
majority.297 Thus, the switch occurred.
Because Justice Roberts did not write an opinion in Morehead or Parrish, we
do not have his written opinion explaining why he changed his vote.
Additionally, after retiring, Justice Roberts destroyed his legal notes.298 In a
1955 law review tribute to the recently deceased Justice Roberts, Justice
Frankfurter published the contents of a memorandum from Justice Roberts
explaining his change of position.299 In the 1945 memorandum, Justice Roberts
asserted that the Court in Morehead was not asked to reconsider the earlier
Adkins precedent.300 Thus, the Court was only asked to decide if the Morehead
and Adkins cases could be distinguished, and, if so, to what effect.301 Justice
Roberts felt the cases could not be distinguished and so voted to uphold the lower
289. David A. Pepper, Against Legalism: Rebutting an Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 63, 75–77, 138 (1998).
290. FDR’s Losing Battle to Pack The Supreme Court, NPR (Apr. 13, 2010 12:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125789097. NPR interviewed Jeff Shesol,
author of the book Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt v. the Supreme Court, written in 2010. Id.
291. See Pepper, supra note 289, at 73–74.
292. Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
293. Id. at 617–18.
294. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see Morehead, 298 U.S. at 609.
295. Barry Cushman, Inside the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 367,
370 (2016); Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313 (1955).
296. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
297. Cushman, supra note 295, at 370.
298. Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 647 (1994).
299. See Frankfurter, supra note 295, at 314–15.
300. Id. at 314.
301. Id.
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court’s ruling striking down the minimum wage law.302 According to Justice
Roberts, his vote changed in Parrish because the Court was asked to reconsider
Adkins, which he believed was wrongly decided.303
Scholars have debated Justice Roberts’ explanation. Some have claimed his
explanation makes sense and is consistent with his behavior as a jurist.304 Others
have argued that Justice Frankfurter’s initial reaction to Justice Roberts’ switch
was accurate—pure politics.305 At least one author has challenged whether
Justice Roberts even wrote the memorandum to Justice Frankfurter.306
Regardless of why Justice Roberts voted as he did in Morehead and Parrish—
a reason was needed. Parrish was a dramatic turning point for the Court. After
Parrish, there was a steady flow of economic legislation that was held
constitutional, which before Parrish, would likely have been struck down.307
Justice Roberts’ vote was widely believed to be in response to President
Roosevelt’s proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court in order to include more
liberal voices.308 Justice Frankfurter rejected this argument claiming that Justice
Roberts’ vote in W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews (which predated President
Roosevelt’s announcement regarding expanding the Supreme Court) clearly
foreshadowed Roberts’ vote in Parrish.309 Other scholars have concurred with
Justice Frankfurter, asserting that Justice Roberts cast his decisive vote in
conference, six weeks before President Roosevelt announced his intention to
expand the Supreme Court.310 However, when no reason is given, speculation
will go where it will.

2. Caballes v. Illinois: Binary Searches and Intimate Details
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Kyllo v. United States.311 In Kyllo, the
Court confronted the question of how to apply the Fourth Amendment to an
investigative technique the founders could not have imagined.312 In this case,
government agents suspected the defendant of using his home to grow
marijuana.313 As part of their investigation, the officers scanned Mr. Kyllo’s
home with a thermal imaging device capable of showing the amount of heat

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Id. at 315.
See Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV 95, 144 (1999).
Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 623 (1994).
Id. at 645–51.
See Cushman, supra note 304, at 144–45.
Ariens, supra note 305, at 631–32.
See id. at 635–36.
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 45 (1998).
311. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
312. See id. at 29.
313. Id.
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escaping from the house relative to others in the neighborhood.314 The agents
were able to see that Mr. Kyllo’s garage and parts of his home were much hotter
than other homes in the area, suggesting that Mr. Kyllo was using heat lamps in
those parts of the house.315 Law enforcement used this and other information to
secure a search warrant.316 The subsequent search revealed approximately 100
marijuana plants.317 Mr. Kyllo objected at trial to the use of the thermal scanning
device on Fourth Amendment grounds.318 His motion to suppress was denied,
and he was convicted.319 The case eventually made it to the Supreme Court
where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that the use of the
thermal scanning device in order to obtain a warrant was unconstitutional.320
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia articulated a rule for countering the
encroachment of technology on Fourth Amendment privacy.321 The new rule
established that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when police use sense
enhancing technology to gather information about a constitutionally protected
area that could not have otherwise been secured without a physical trespass.322
Kyllo was a 5–4 decision with Justice Stevens writing a vigorous dissent.323
Among his objections to the majority’s opinion was that the Court’s new rule
would limit the impact of the contraband exception to the Fourth Amendment,
or the binary search doctrine.324 Under this doctrine any investigative technique
that only reveals the presence or absence of contraband is not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not reveal anything in which
an individual would have a legitimate privacy interest.325 Justice Stevens stated:
It is clear, however, that the category of “sense-enhancing technology”
covered by the new rule…is far too broad. It would, for example,
embrace potential mechanical substitutes for dogs trained to react
when they sniff narcotics. But in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707…(1983), we held that a dog sniff that “discloses only the presence
or absence of narcotics” does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” and it must follow that
sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity

314. Id. at 29–30.
315. Id. at 30.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 40 (remanding the case to determine the validity of the search warrant absent the
use of heat lamps).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 34–35.
323. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 47–48 (Stevens J., dissenting).
325. Id.
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is not a search either. Nevertheless, the use of such a device would be
unconstitutional under the Court’s rule….326
Approximately four years later, the Court issued its next case dealing with the
dog sniffs, Illinois v. Caballes.327 In Caballes, a police officer pulled a car over
for speeding.328 During the time it took the officer to process the ticket, another
officer arrived with a narcotics dog.329 The officers walked the dog around Mr.
Caballes’ car, and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs.330 A subsequent
search revealed illegal drugs, and the defendant was arrested.331 At trial, the
defense brought a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the dog
sniff, claiming the dog sniff was an illegal search.332
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, found the dog sniff was
not a search.333 Further, so long as the use of the narcotics dog did not detain
the defendant any longer than would have occurred as a result of issuing a ticket,
no Fourth Amendment violation would occur.334 This finding was all that was
necessary to answer the question before the Court, but Justice Stevens continued.
In the second to last paragraph of his majority opinion, Justice Stevens
explained:
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the
use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in
a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27…(2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the device
was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details
in a home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes
her daily sauna and bath.”335
Justice Stevens’ description of the impact of Kyllo on the binary search doctrine
appeared to have made a 180-degree turn between his dissent in 2001 and his
majority opinion in 2005.336 In 2001, the Kyllo majority opinion was too broad
because it prevented the use of mechanical devices that only detect
contraband.337 In 2005, the Kyllo decision only reached searches that could
reveal lawful activity in the home.338
326. Id.
327. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 407.
333. Id. at 409.
334. Id. at 407–08.
335. Id. at 409–10.
336. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47–48 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
with Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10.
337. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10.

286

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.2:1

A reading of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo and Justice Stevens’
dissent make it appear that the Caballes description of Kyllo is not accurate.
Justice Stevens appears to recast Kyllo as only reaching searches that reveal
“intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath.’”339 Such a recasting without further
explanation simply does not withstand review. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
did not draw a distinction between intimate and non-intimate details in the
home.340 Justice Scalia explained that making such a distinction would be both
wrong and impracticable. The reason such a distinction would be wrong is
because “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”341 Thus, the Kyllo
decision was not linked to a distinction between intimate and non-intimate
details or questions of daily sauna use.
Was Justice Stevens dishonest in the second to last paragraph of Caballes?
Possibly, but there is an obvious other possible explanation: he changed his
mind. Moreover, Justice Scalia might also have changed his mind. During oral
argument in Caballes, Justice Scalia asked:
Why…are you sure that Kyllo…would have come out the same way if
the only thing…that the imaging could pick out is not any of the other
private activities in the home, but the only thing it could possibly
discern is a dead body with a knife through the heart? Are you sure
the case would have come out the same way? I’m not at all sure.342
Although divining a Justice’s position by the questions they ask at oral argument
is potentially unwise—this statement could have signaled a change or
clarification of Justice Scalia’s view.343
If Justice Stevens arrived at a different conclusion in Caballes than Kyllo, then
an explanation was in order. It did not need to be long—it could have simply
been a footnote—but changes in views, especially as dramatic as that in
Caballes, need an explanation or face the inference that one of the opinions was
untruthful.
D. Responding to Choke Points
In each of the above examples, I have suggested ways that the Justices may
have been able to enhance the apparent honesty of their opinions. As I provide
these suggestions, it is with one of President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous
quotes in mind, “It is not the critic that counts…[t]he credit belongs to
339. Id.
340. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37–39.
341. Id. at 37.
342. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923).
343. Compare Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 342, at 9, with Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013) (refusing to rely on Kyllo to decide the case, which could have been due to a
continuing belief in the contraband exception or an unwillingness to disturb a precedent
unnecessarily).
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the…[person] who is actually in the arena.”344 My discussion of credibility
choke points and methods of enhancing apparent honesty is undertaken with an
awareness of the enormous challenge facing Supreme Court Justices. I am
further aware of the ease of critique when given an abundance of time and the
thoughtful examination of each Supreme Court opinion by hundreds of legal
experts and scholars. My suggestions seek only to offer approaches to consider
when issuing opinions. With all that said, I suggest three methods of enhancing
apparent honesty: refutation of the strongest counter arguments, distinguishing
doctrinal application, and explanation of changing positions.

1. Refutation
Refutation is a core element of persuasive communication and is frequently a
part of Supreme Court opinions. The refutation is necessary for an audience to
understand why the author of an opinion is unpersuaded by counter arguments.
In some cases, Justices engage in refutation but fail to respond to a central
counter argument. In these instances, a reader’s perception could be that the
author of the opinion did not refute the counter position because they have no
reply. This in turn can leave the impression that the author of the opinion is
merely seeking an outcome and is writing whatever they feel is necessary to
achieve that end. An example of this failure to refute can arguably be seen in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Dickerson.
The central counter-argument to the Dickerson majority opinion was that
there cannot be a constitutional rule whose violation does not violate the
Constitution.345 Thus, either Miranda was not a constitutional rule and § 3501
should be effective, or Miranda was/is a constitutional decision, and the cases
describing the Miranda warnings as prophylactic were in error. In essence,
Justice Douglas made this argument in his dissent to Michigan v. Tucker.346 This
argument was central to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that Miranda had been
effectively overruled by § 3501 and to Justice Scalia’s dissent. Nowhere in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion does he explain how this contradiction is
resolved.

2. Distinguishing Doctrinal Application
Distinguishing doctrinal application requires a Justice to examine their own
perspectives on a particular doctrine and how they have articulated that approach
in the past. Justices’ opinions are generally more credible when they present a
coherent judicial philosophy, at least with regard to particular doctrines. When
Justices stray from their stated approach, it often leads to allegations of
outcome-directed opinion writing. Justice Scalia, perhaps the most well-known
344. Theodore Roosevelt’s: Citizenship in a Republic, The Man in the Arena, LEADERSHIP
NOW (Apr. 23, 2010), https://www.leadershipnow.com/tr-citizenship.html.
345. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445–46 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
346. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 462–63 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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advocate of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, was
frequently accused of failing to apply that interpretative approach evenly.347
When a Justice uses a particular theory of constitutional interpretation in one
way in a case and then ignores that theory in a different case or applies the theory
differently, the apparent honesty of the opinion is reduced.
One of the challenges to the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore was that several
of the Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas) had voting histories that seemed inconsistent with the majority
opinion.348 Thus, giving the appearance that these Justices voted as they did to
achieve an end without really believing it was the proper vehicle. Arguably, this
perception was reinforced by the per curium’s effort to limit the precedential
impact of its opinion by stating, “Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities.”349 This, coupled with other aspects of
the decision, led to some of the most damning criticism of a Supreme Court
decision in recent history.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has also been criticized for his fluid views regarding
stare decisis.350 One scholar asserted that the Chief Justice’s opinions in
Dickerson and Casey “lack[ed] a principled distinction to be drawn between his
opinions” regarding stare decisis.351 That scholar goes on to conclude, “[T]he
distinction drawn [between the two cases] is not jurisprudential, but
ideological.”352
In each of the above cases, it is likely that the Justices involved would have
had an explanation for why they applied the particular legal doctrines differently
from one case to another. However, because no explanation is provided, the
Court’s audience is left to speculate. Those members of the Court’s audience
who are unhappy with the outcome are more likely to conclude the Justices are
not being entirely honest.
3. Explaining Apparent Changes in Jurisprudential Direction
Apparent changes in jurisprudential direction do not necessarily mean a
Justice has changed his or her opinion, only that it appears as if the Justice has

347. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1497 (2008); Jeffrey
M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 89, 107–08 (2010).
348. Elspeth Reeve, Just How Bad Was Bush v. Gore?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2010),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/11/just-how-bad-was-bush-v-gore/343247/.
349. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000); RONALD DWORKIN, A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10
(2002).
350. William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional State Decisis:
Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 94
(2002).
351. Id. at 95.
352. Id.
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changed direction. After the Parrish decision, Justice Roberts asserted that he
had not changed his opinion from the Morehead decision.353 Rather, he claimed
that because the questions asked were different, his answers were different. In
other circumstances, like Justice Stevens’ opinions in Kyllo and Caballes, where
there is no explanation available, it seems more likely that the Justice changed
his mind.
An example of a Justice providing an explanation of an apparent change in
jurisprudential direction can be seen in one of Justice Scalia’s opinions. In his
concurring opinion in Arizona v. Gant, Justice Scalia acknowledged his apparent
jurisprudential change and why it was occurring.
In Gant, which was described above, Justice Scalia joined the majority but
also authored a concurring opinion. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens
stated that a search incident to the lawful arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle
could occur in two circumstances: first, if the arrestee was within grabbing
distance of the passenger compartment; and second, if there was a reasonable
basis for believing evidence of the crime the suspect was arrested for could be
found in the passenger compartment.354 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
explained why he had joined the majority despite having written in an earlier
decision, United States v. Thornton, that the grabbing distance justification for
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest was likely unreasonable.355 Justice
Scalia explained that he joined the majority because a 4–1–4 opinion in an area
that demanded clarity was unacceptable.356 Thus, he joined the majority in this
instance because to do otherwise would create confusion in police practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an interview in 2010, Justice Scalia stated, “The only article in faith that
plays any part in my judging is the commandment, Thou Shalt Not Lie.”357 This
is likely a commandment to which every Supreme Court Justice who has worn
the robes would subscribe. However, in the context of Supreme Court opinions,
I suggest more is needed. Not only must the Justice be honest, but they must be
apparently honest.
We ask a great deal of the Justices of the Supreme Court. We expect the
wisdom of Solomon and the logic of Plato. We bring to the Court our most
difficult legal questions and social issues. The Court is asked to resolve these
disputes, set rules to govern future disputes, balance a wide variety of interests
and social needs, and then persuade its audience that the decision is correct. The

353. See Frankfurter, supra note 295, at 314–15.
354. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
355. Id. at 351–54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
356. Id. at 354 (Scalia, J., concurring).
357. David Gibson, Justice Scalia: ‘No Such Thing as a Catholic Judge’, COMMONWEAL
MAG. (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/justice-scalia-no-such-thingcatholic-judge.
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Court, as an institution, relies heavily on the persuasive force of its opinions, and
apparent honesty is critical to that persuasive force. Thus, not only must
dishonesty be rejected, but even the appearance of dishonesty must be avoided.
Politically charged cases, changes in a Justice’s thinking on an issue, and the
treatment of precedent, all present the potential for appearing untruthful. By
approaching these situations with special care and refuting counter arguments,
distinguishing cases, and explaining apparent jurisprudential changes, Justices
can enhance the apparent honesty of their opinions.

